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1. Introduction 
Supply chains have gradually become the prevalent form of industrial organisation around the 
world, expanding not only geographically but also in terms of the economic activities that 
they organise (Wright and Kaine, 2015). While the growing importance of supply chains 
creates opportunities for firms to increase profits and outsource some of the production to 
lower cost locations, it also generates pressures for labour (Marchington et al., 2005). These 
pressures emerge from the structure of the supply chain: they relate to the way in which 
leading firms monitor suppliers in order to control product specification through various 
mechanisms such as quality and quantity standards, delivery dates and prices. In doing so, 
firms may attempt to co-ordinate inter-firm relations through the use of monitoring and 
auditing practices, changing customer demands and price pressures (Gereffi et al., 2005) or 
setting rules over specific aspects of production (Robinson and Rainbird, 2013). Although 
existing research documents the detrimental effects such pressures have on working 
conditions (Lloyd and James, 2008; Newsome et al., 2013; Moore and Newsome, 2018; 
Wright and Lund, 2003), much less attention has been paid to how the trade unions’ agency is 
constrained or enabled by supply chain dynamics and, specifically, to whether trade unions 
are able to utilise their strategic position within the supply chain to regulate employers’ 
behaviours and effectively represent workers’ interests (Riisgaard and Hammer, 2011). To 
address this gap this article asks how does the power of organised labour vary within a supply 
chain context? Furthermore, it asks which factors explain union success or failure in 
defending workers’ interests in such a context? 
To answer these questions, the article explores two different but interrelated processes 
through which supply chains structure capital-labour relations and the workers’ agency at the 
workplace level. First, it examines how supply chain pressures driven by cost-efficiency and 
flexibility rationales are cascaded down and have important implications for the labour 
process and labour relations at the workplace level (Newsome et al., 2015). Employer 
attempts to cut down costs and respond to supply chain demands result in work degradation, 
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intensified precariousness, flexibility and increased levels of control. Second, by resorting to 
mobilisation theory (Kelly, 1998) the article highlights the fate of organised labour does not 
have to follow a predetermined path. On the contrary, the structural organisation of the supply 
chains opens possibilities for trade unions to articulate an agenda that transcends the 
workplace. In cases where trade unions use their power resources to build coalitions across 
the supply chain, they maintain their relevance in the workplace. By locating the examination 
of the trade unions’ agency at the supply chain level, this article contributes to the current 
debates on labour as an active constituent of the global economy (Newsome et al., 2015; 
Riisgaard and Hammer, 2011). 
The article is organised as follows: the next section embeds our argument in the current 
literature by focusing on the effects of supply chain pressures on working conditions. It also 
discusses the links between trade union power resources, supply chain pressures, and 
opportunities for mobilisation. The following section describes our methods and presents our 
case selection. The findings section examines the variation in outcomes across the two cases 
and explores the factors that explain it. The final section reviews the main findings of the article 
and outlines its contribution to the literature on supply chain rationalisation and on trade union 
strategies. 
 
2. Supply chain dynamics and the impact on working conditions 
The ways in which one firm can influence working conditions in other firms across the supply 
chain has been consistently analysed within the employment relations literature (Wright and 
Kaine, 2015). Although some suggest that supply chains may generate the conditions for new 
and better employment opportunities (Beaumont et al., 1996; Scarbrough, 2000), the vast 
majority argue that supply chains change the nature of production dynamics and create 
downward pressures that ultimately require supplier firms to rationalise production. In the 
Australian food and grocery industry, Wright and Lund (2003) note that large supermarkets 
increasingly squeezed their suppliers through auditing and monitoring activities in a bid to 
control costs and enhance the reliability of deliveries. These pressures had direct implications 
for workers who witnessed an erosion of their terms and conditions through direct monitoring 
of the labour process, increased levels of work intensification, unstable patterns of working 
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time and precarious contractual arrangements (see also Lloyd and James, 2008 and Newsome 
et al., 2013). 
The labour process theory tradition has also identified critical developments within 
contemporary supply chains that saw firms and managers leverage new technologies and 
availability of insecure employment to augment their control over the workplace (Price 2016).  
New technologies are employed to reduce the indeterminacy of labour. An emphasis on the 
indeterminacy of labour recognises that the purchase of labour power alone does not secure a 
predefined quantity and quality of labour and that the employer needs to extract the latter 
through mechanisms of control (Thompson and Newsome, 2004). The way in which 
employers achieve this varies across time and is relative to the context within which the 
capital-labour relation is embedded (Thompson and Van den Broek, 2010). Within the supply 
chain context, where it is argued that the ‘locus of control’ has shifted from workplace to 
inter-firm level (Thompson and Van den Broek, 2010), technology has been identified as a 
key mechanism used by dominant firms to control the labour process. New information and 
communication technology (ICT) is not only used to monitor and forecast production and 
consumption patterns but also to legitimise the extension of control and surveillance 
(Bonacich and Hamilton, 2011). On a slightly different note, Newsome (2015) adds that the 
pressures resulting from the application of complex technological systems transform invisible 
parts of the supply chain into visible ones whereby workers are tracked and their performance 
tightly monitored in order to ensure a smooth and reliable production. 
Furthermore, the literature has discussed the role that workforce reconfiguration and 
fragmentation into core and peripheral groups have in the context of supply chains. Although 
flexible working practices have the potential to benefit employers, employees or both 
(Karlsson, 2007), employers’ efforts to remove unproductive labour and adjust labour costs to 
meet growing demands may result in temporal and numerical flexibility that is conducive of 
their particular business and supply chain needs (Price, 2016). For instance, Moore and 
Newsome (2018) emphasise how firms in the parcel delivery industry responded to supply 
chain pressures through the use of differentiated contractual statuses that allowed them to 
minimise costs. In particular, firms externalised non-delivery costs to self-employed workers 
while also using insecure contracts as a strategy for minimising labour costs. 
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2.1    Trade union power resources and supply chain dynamics 
While the organisation of the supply chains provides the structural conditions that shape 
labour and the labour process, it is the capacity of workers to organise, mobilise and 
strategically use power resources that ultimately matter for employment outcomes at the 
workplace or wider organisational level. Mobilisation theory (Kelly, 1998) provides a 
valuable entry point into theorising the workers’ agency by highlighting the conflicting 
interests between workers and management and the factors that allow workers to build and 
mobilise their power resources. 
Drawing on a subset of social movement concepts (Gamson, 1992; McAdam, 1988; Tilly, 
1978), Kelly (1998: 24-38) argues that collective action is the result of a sequence of 
interrelated processes involving interests, mobilisation, organisation, opportunity and action. 
Particularly important within the analysis of the workers’ agency in the context of supply 
chain rationalisation is the definition of interests and the degree to which groups of 
employees see themselves as similar, different from or opposed to other groups in the 
workplace. Mobilisation theory asserts that ‘collective organisation and activity ultimately 
stem from employer actions that generate amongst its employees a sense of injustice or 
illegitimacy’ (Kelly, 1998: 44). It is this sense of injustice that will define similar interests 
amongst the workforce. Once interests are defined, factors internal to the group (how a group 
is structured and its capacity to collectively utilise its power resources) as well as the relative 
power resources of management and workers are essential for the success of collective action. 
Recent debates within the mobilisation theory argue that mobilising and organising are two 
conceptually distinct phenomena that embody different strategic choices of trade unions; 
whereas mobilising is an exercise in using existing power resources, deep organising 
describes a continuous effort to activate latent members or workers outside the union who can 
challenge injustices within the workplace (Holgate et al., 2018). 
Power resources provide unions the strategic capacity to further their own interests and to 
regulate work by empowering workers through their representative function (Hyman, 1975; 
Lévesque and Murray, 2010). Trade unions can tap into or develop various power resources 
to effectively pursue and defend the interests of their constituencies. These can be either 
resources that are rooted in the institutional arrangements that govern the economy or in the 
trade unions’ own characteristics (Gumbrell-McCormick and Hyman, 2013). 
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Institutional power is generated by the location of unions within different national regulatory 
contexts with historically different roles assumed by organised labour. In the UK, institutional 
power has been on the decline since the 1980s with the employment relationship becoming 
ever more individualised and unions accepting partnership agreements with employers which 
has contributed to their declining capacity to effectively protect the interests of workers 
(Badigannavar and Kelly, 2011; Heery, 2016). The emergence of these local agreements was 
driven by the desire to mend the growing antagonistic employment relations that emerged 
during the 1980s and to generate a two-way channel of communication between unions and 
employers. However, the demise of voluntarism and the growing systemic hostility towards 
organised labour have ultimately led to an unequal power relationship at the local level which 
saw employers gain the upper hand in collective bargaining. Indeed, while the partnership 
agenda broadened the role of the unions to include informal consultation and ongoing 
dialogue on a wide range of issues (Wilton, 2011), in reality trade unions lost the institutional 
lever of power that proved effective in securing better wages and working conditions. The 
corollary of the above is Kelly’s (1996) argument that forming partnership agreements with 
management can weaken the trade union, suggesting that the partnership was born out of the 
necessity of trade unions to find alternative ways to re-institutionalise collective bargaining in 
the context of growing state hostility and employer unilateralism. 
By comparison, structural power is defined as the ‘power that results simply from the location 
of workers within the economic system’ (Wright, 2000: 962). Wright (2000) further 
distinguishes between two subtypes of structural power: workplace bargaining power which 
is the power that workers possess because of their location, and marketplace bargaining 
power which is the power that workers can derive from tight labour markets. Within the 
context of supply chains, workplace bargaining power is influenced by the specific position 
that firms occupy within the production process and is essential for whether or not trade 
unions can activate other forms of power (Silver, 2003). The effectiveness of workplace 
bargaining power depends on the local capacity to acknowledge the location of the firm 
within the supply chain and the potential to cause disruptions. For instance, Bonacich and 
Wilson’s (2008) study demonstrates that rationalised supply chains can provide workers with 
the opportunity to use stoppages in specific ‘choke points’ to advance their interests. By 
comparison, marketplace power is enhanced when firms cannot secure their labour needs 
through external recruitment. The situation can be caused by a variety of reasons: low levels 
of labour market segmentation, low levels of unemployment and underemployment, skill 
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mismatches generating an undersupply of specific skills in particular sectors of the economy, 
the capacity of workers to exit the labour market or emigration (Flecker et al., 2013; Silver, 
2003). These conditions enhance the power of workers and trade unions in as much as firms 
will seek to retain existing employees in the absence of external recruitment opportunities. 
Associational power encompasses ‘the various forms of power that result from the formation 
of collective organisations of workers’ (Wright, 2000: 962) and refers to the ability of unions 
to recruit and represent workers. It encompasses the array of resources that trade unions can 
utilise through their membership and is therefore ‘grounded most directly in worker 
solidarity’ (Doellgast et al. 2018: 19). Since associational power depends on the ability of 
workers to organise a broad membership base, exclusive union strategies that give up to the 
rationalisation agenda and exclude non-standard workers will weaken it (Doellgast et al. 
2018; Wright and Lund 2003). In Kelly’s (1998) terms, a fragmented workforce gives 
employers the upper hand in setting terms and conditions since they can leverage existing 
divisions to prevent the articulation of common interests. Therefore, the ‘egalitarian 
commitments’ that can generate workplace solidarity become more difficult to articulate 
(Hyman, 1997: 521). 
The common conjecture of these approaches is that the control and contestations over the 
labour process have consequences not only for working conditions but also for the capacity of 
workers to organise collectively. Thus, struggles at workplace and supply chain level underlie 
the balance of power between employer and workers. The following sections examine these 
issues through a detailed analysis of the power relations and outcomes across two firms that 
operate within the same supply chain. The case studies reveal that despite similar structural 
pressures, working conditions outcomes and union-management power relations differ 
substantially between the two firms. In addition, the two case studies provide insights into the 
role of workers as crucial agents of change at workplace and industry level.  
 
3. Methodology and Case Selection 
This paper is based on eighteen months of fieldwork in the Scottish Spirits Industry (SSI) 
undertaken between July 2013 and January 2015. The industry was traditionally producer-
driven, with large spirits manufacturers playing a dominant role in setting the rules and 
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requirements within the supply chain (Marks et al., 1998). However, in the last twenty years 
this dominance has diminished. The internationalisation of the sector went hand-in-hand with 
the expansion of national and international markets prompted by discount-driven global 
supermarket chains (Scotch-whisky.org.uk, 2012). The intense concentration and 
consolidation of large supermarkets has enabled them to establish the entry requirements for 
the consumer market through mechanisms of influencing production and distribution 
processes across supply chains (Lichtenstein, 2009). Given these pressures, cost control 
compounded by lead and delivery targets has become a key concern for management of 
spirits manufacturers.  
This study focused on medium and large-sized workplaces (with over 100 employees), since 
these are more likely to have established supply chain and human resource management 
practices with formalised approaches to employment relations. To control the heterogeneity 
of practices across different sectors and businesses, two workplaces operating within the same 
supply chain were selected. In addition, the case selection allowed for the isolation of the 
impact of lead firm policies across different suppliers as well as the effectiveness of strategies 
that trade unions used in response.  
Data were gathered from two firms where different styles of trade unionism prevails. The first 
workplace, BottlingCo, is a spirit bottling site owned by an established medium-sized 
Scottish spirit manufacturer. The company employs 900 employees in the UK, with around 
200 working in BottlingCo. BottlingCo bottles and packages different types of spirits and 
ships them to supermarkets both in the UK and around the world. The human resource 
management and employment relations strategies are managed centrally from the company’s 
headquarters and practices are enacted by the managers at workplace level. The trade union in 
BottlingCo signed a partnership agreement in the late 1990s in order to avoid derecognition.  
The second workplace, HaulageCo, is a well-established medium-sized logistics provider 
based in Scotland and owned by a larger investment group. The company employs 220 
employees, the majority of whom are drivers. The company is managed through its 
headquarters where route controllers and office staff control and monitor the labour process 
and implement management practices with the purpose of further integrating the company 
within supply chain processes. These management practices were requisite for securing high-
value contractual services to a number of spirits manufacturers, including BottlingCo. The 
trade union in HaulageCo had been recognised by management four years prior to the start of 
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fieldwork and since then has been able to successfully increase membership density within 
the workplace.  
This article draws on qualitative data from 39 semi-structured interviews as well as focus 
groups, union meetings, observational fieldwork and documentary data. The themes of the 
interviews and focus groups included supply chain and market characteristics, the nature of 
work, the labour process and trade union activities. In both case studies all interviews were 
recorded and lasted at least 45 minutes with workers and line managers and more than one 
hour with senior managers and union representatives. In BottlingCo, 23 semi-structured 
interviews were conducted, including eleven shop-floor workers (of which seven were 
contracted on permanent, full time contracts and four on precarious contracts), seven senior, 
middle and line managers, one HR member of staff, the HR director and three union 
representatives. In addition to these interviews, two focus groups were conducted involving a 
total of eleven participants including senior and middle managers. At HaulageCo a total of 
sixteen semi-structured interviews were conducted with thirteen informants, including three 
union representatives and ten drivers (seven were union members). Primary data were also 
secured from four union branch meetings where union representatives and members discussed 
themes relevant to this research, particularly those related to management responses to supply 
chain dynamics and requirements and trade union recruitment and mobilisation strategies. In 
both case studies, data were also drawn from direct observation where long hours spent on 
companies’ premises enabled the observation of informal interactions between employees and 
the ways in which they experienced working conditions. Secondary data were derived from 
official documents such as staff policy, HR documents, employment contracts, service level 
agreements, union-employer agreements and union meetings. 
 
Following Miles and Huberman’s (1994) interactive model, the data was thematically 
analysed in Nvivo using codes and sub-codes which were linked to specific topics such as 
supply chain rationalisation, labour process and the worker agency (Richards, 1999). In 
addition to these no other theme that might emerge from the data was excluded. Data 
reduction was utilised to systematise and analyse interviews, focus groups, meetings 
transcripts, observation notes and documents. A process of open, axial and selective coding 
was used to de-codify data, identify links and relationships between themes and produce 
integrative categories (Saunders et al., 2009). Throughout the analytical process, triangulation 
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of different data sources was used to refine and strengthen interpretations. Interviews and 
union meetings in different workplaces were particularly important to confirm and/or refute 
informants’ recollections of events.  
 
4. Findings 
The analysis presented in this section is organised into two sub-sections. The first section 
covers the inter-firm dynamics and how these shape labour and the labour process in both 
case studies. The second covers how trade unions are constrained, or not, by supply chain 
pressures and how they are able to utilise their power resources. 
4.1 Inter-firm power dynamics and labour process control 
The two suppliers faced similar supply chain pressures. The inter-firm relations between 
BottlingCo and retailers were characterised by constant tensions rooted in supermarkets’ strict 
product requirements. These were predicated upon achieving established targets related to 
price, quality and reliability of supply which could vary depending on the supermarkets’ 
decision to offer unplanned promotions to consumers. Interviewees consistently reported 
problems associated with juggling the various, sometimes contradictory, pressures as the site 
manager commented:  
With retailers we are constantly being told what specifications to follow. They 
pretty much set the standards for entering the consumer market. They’ll set the 
price… they’ll hold you against any label that is slightly off… they’ll set arbitrary 
dates to put an order out and then change it for no apparent reason. I mean, this 
(…) will drive the way we organise work, the way we hire employees… it will 
also set the relationship we have with people working on the shop-floor. (Site 
Manager, BottlingCo) 
Failing to meet such demands would result in financial penalties and ultimately being unlisted 
from the supermarkets’ list of suppliers: ‘There’s always a threat if you let them 
[supermarkets] down… because you risk losing [business] to somebody else’ (Supply Chain 
Manager 2, BottlingCo). 
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These pressures required management to rationalise the supply chain through policies that 
increased labour casualisation. Managers consistently justified the increasing reliance on 
numerical flexibility through the use of non-standard and precarious contracts for responding 
to fluctuations in demand. Documents from the HR department showed that temporary and 
annualised-hour contracts became so widespread that during demand peaks 70 percent of 
workers were employed on these non-standard contracts. Each non-standard contract had its 
purposes and its own terms and conditions. Temporary contracts were used to cope with 
predictable supply chain fluctuations since they could only be terminated after a week’s 
notice period. In contrast, annualised-hour contracts allowed management to respond to 
sudden and unplanned changes since workers could be called in to work or sent home 
according to the needs of the firm. Moreover, workers employed on annualised-hour contracts 
could see their annual working hours shift depending on the forecasted demand for the 
upcoming year. In addition to these practices, the firm emphasised temporal flexibility that 
saw the replacement of the standard 38-hour working week coupled with overtime and shift 
rotation with varying shift patterns and unpredictable changes in shifts and rostering. 
All workers highlighted the increasing precarious conditions in the workplace. For instance, 
one temporary worker reported that although individuals were offered fixed-term 
employment, oftentimes management terminated contracts before the end date in order to 
adjust staffing levels and control labour costs. Annualised-hour workers also reported 
unpredictable working time because ‘management can take your hours like that’ (Employee 
9, BottlingCo). All workers also emphasised the increasingly uncertain nature of shift 
allocation, where many experienced ‘last-minute calls to work’ (Employee 5, BottlingCo) and 
others were ‘sent home after two hours of getting to the bond, because demand was that low’ 
(Employee 10, BottlingCo).  
In HaulageCo, the inter-firm relations with spirits manufacturers, including BottlingCo, were 
also predicated on imbalanced power relations. HaulageCo competed directly for service 
agreements with another logistics provider operating within the same supply chain. The 
allocation of service agreements was contingent on whether companies complied with set 
supply chain requirements such as lead times, reliability of supply and cost competitiveness. 
Supply chain rationalisation meant that deliveries became increasingly unpredictable, a 
situation reported by interviewees in HaulageCo. This situation was also described by supply 
chain managers at BottlingCo, who typically stated that ‘we are their [HaulageCo] biggest 
12 
 
customer, so if we suddenly have a peak and say “we really need that extra spirit”, we expect 
[HaulageCo] to respond promptly’ (Supply Chain Manager 3, BottlingCo). As a result, two 
union representatives at HaulageCo reported increasing managerial control over the labour 
process and drivers. One union representative commented: 
They [HaulageCo management] have been pushed into providing more 
transparency and more traceability across the supply chain so that [BottlingCo] 
and others can optimise their production and further decrease labour costs. What’s 
been demanded at times is the requirement to diminish non-productive time which 
means finding solutions to better control drivers’ positions and movements. 
(Union Representative 2, HaulageCo) 
Practices implemented by HaulageCo management to cope with supply chain pressures 
created unintended consequences for drivers’ working conditions. Due to all drivers being 
contracted on a permanent full-time basis due to the ‘lack of certificated lorry drivers in the 
local labour market’ (Union Representative 1, HaulageCo), management had to rely on 
temporal flexibility to accommodate supply chain demands. All drivers and union 
representatives reported having to work more non-standard working hours and to accept 
unpredictable changes to schedules. Interviews were rife with accounts of drivers reporting 
changes in working time schedules, shift extensions or extra weekend shifts so that 
HaulageCo could respond to supply chain demands. 
Interviewees also reported the introduction of tracking technology to provide detailed 
monitoring of drivers’ positions, establish more efficient routes and accurately plan and co-
ordinate the loading and schedule of lorry movements. During interviews and union meetings, 
the majority of drivers emphasised that the system gradually stripped out the tacit knowledge 
acquired by experienced drivers and constrained them to comply with automation. In addition 
to this system of labour process control, union representatives reported that rationalisation 
had also generated poor working conditions and hazardous health and safety standards. 
According to one union representative, the pressures imposed on HaulageCo to provide more 
and better services at ever lower costs have led the company to ‘neglect the most basic health 
and safety standards if that means more return at the end of the year’ (Union Representative 
1, HaulageCo). 
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4.2 Workers capacity and resources for regulating and shaping working conditions 
Documents provided by the HR department and union representatives revealed that in 
BottlingCo, the trade union density rate was 56 percent and that it varied depending on 
contractual statuses. Nearly one hundred per cent of the permanent full time workers were 
union members, while only 10 percent of temporary workers and 56 percent of workers on 
annualised-hour contracts were unionised. Despite the relatively high level of union 
membership in the workplace, interviewees indicated that the union’s associational and 
structural power resources remained low which reduced the union’s capacity to mobilise 
workers around an inclusive agenda. The principal cause of weakness was the partnership 
agreement. Although it guaranteed recognition, the agreement proved detrimental for the 
interests of workers and was used as a means to rationalise working conditions and to recast 
the employment relationship along market principles.  
Managers and union representatives recounted how the market would be the ultimate driver 
of change within the workplace. This rule was presented to the union and workers as an 
unavoidable characteristic of the business model. During an interview, one line-manager 
commented: 
One of the biggest challenges in here is to actually make workers understand that 
we need to be prepared to adjust to the needs of the business. For me it’s kind of 
common sense, but I need to constantly remind them [workers] that’s beyond our 
control. (Line Manager 5, BottlingCo) 
The union representatives legitimated management’s discourse and defended the 
rationalisation agenda as part of the partnership approach the union adopted. Most workers 
highlighted that the union accepted the extensive use of flexible employment contracts 
justified on the grounds of having to follow the exigencies imposed by the supply chain. As 
one worker explained during an interview: 
[During union meetings] what we are asked is if there are any legitimate reasons 
not to accept changes in shifts or things like that, then the line manager and the 
company expects us to accept these changes. Management requires a certain level 
of flexibility (…). We are asked to understand that and that’s pretty much what 
reps try to explain. (Employee 5, BottlingCo) 
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These accounts show that the union response to growing pressures for flexibility has been to 
defensively align itself with management. Acting within the confines of the managerial 
agenda, the union implicitly consented to increasing casualisation of the workforce which, in 
turn, limited its capacity to recruit and organise precarious workers. For example, one union 
representative highlighted that contractual precariousness created ‘real barriers to engage with 
flexi[ble] workers’ (Union Representative 2, BottlingCo). The union representative elaborates 
on how numerical and temporal flexibility constrained the union to recruit new members: 
Flexi[ble] workers are here for very short periods of time which makes it difficult 
to engage with them. And many of the times they are jumping from shift to shift, 
they don’t have fixed hours, which means we don’t know exactly when they’re 
here… the union struggles a wee bit to keep track of them, in a nutshell, really. 
(Union representative 2, BottlingCo) 
Recruitment constraints were compounded by workers’ perceptions that contracts were 
becoming increasingly precarious, which ‘laid bare their vulnerability towards the employer’ 
(Union Representative 2, BottlingCo). Non-standard workers backed the union’s view by 
discussing how precarious contracts were being used as a basis for subtle threats that 
intensified the feeling of vulnerability. One temporary worker commented during the 
interview that ‘you are often told that we get much better conditions than in other bonds (…) 
we get told “wake up and smell the coffee”’ (Employee 4, BottlingCo). Another temporary 
worker reported how she felt dependent on a relatively well-paid job ‘to boost finances, even 
for a short period of the year’ (Employee 2, BottlingCo). Workers also emphasised how the 
union was mostly focused on defending the interests of permanent, full-time workers but not 
those of the flexible workers. An annualised-hour worker discussing his involvement with the 
union in previous jobs, draws a comparison with the union at BottlingCo: 
I used to be involved in the union in my previous job, I was a shop steward. But 
once I came into this company, the union doesn’t care much about the workers in 
here. They are full-timers’ orientated. They negotiate for us the pay and all that, 
but they don’t really care about the flexis [non-standard workers]. So I just went 
like that, cancelled my membership. (Employee 3, BottlingCo) 
The inability of the union to articulate a common interest and pursue an inclusive agenda 
around workplace issues ultimately divested it of associational power. With mobilisation 
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becoming an impossibility, the union retreated into a defensive stance that relied entirely on 
an exclusive strategy (Doellgast et al., 2018). The narrowing associational resources impacted 
on the marketplace bargaining power of workers since management found it easier to access a 
large pool of non-standard workers to cope with fluctuations in demand.  
In HaulageCo, despite being recognised by the employer only recently, the union organised 
85 per cent of the workforce. Nevertheless, drivers and union representatives emphasised how 
supply chain rationalisation functioned as a repressive mechanism against drivers’ agency. 
Half of the interviewed drivers and all union representatives reported that the implicit 
requirements to take on weekend shifts and longer working days constrained drivers’ 
availability to participate in union meetings (which took place on Saturdays) and to ‘properly 
carry out union rep tasks in a timely manner (…) from simple things like writing up 
meetings’ agendas, to more complex… setting up training events and all that sort of stuff’ 
(Union Representative 2, HaulageCo). Interviewees highlighted the role of the newly 
implemented tracking technology used by management to control and monitor drivers’ 
positions and delivery times and establish more efficient routes as a key mechanism that 
constrained their capacity to exercise agency and control the labour process. One driver 
commented: 
We are at a point where they [management] want to have all the control over work 
for the sake of hitting [supply chain] targets. We had control over work but with 
the sat-navs it’s like taking away all that was ours and making us work like 
machines. (Driver 4, HaulageCo) 
Another driver made it clear that repression was achieved because the satellite navigation 
system replaced any input drivers may have had during work:  
What essentially sat-navs do is to silence folks out there (…). There’s no voice 
anymore since the machine does that for you. (Driver 1, HaulageCo)  
Despite these constraints, interviewees consistently emphasised the union’s strategy to attract 
and engage with prospective new members by framing health and safety issues as a key 
problem in the workplace. Union representatives reported a range of health and safety training 
events aimed not only to develop drivers’ skills, but also to promote associational power. 
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[Health and safety] training activities give drivers who are members another 
reason to stay in the union, because it’s like realising that trade unions is [sic] not 
only about pay and they are also into training. To non-members we do ask for 
their feedback at the time they are attending these sessions, we ask them: ‘are you 
a union member ... has it changed your perception of trade unions?’ (…) we find 
people are increasingly joining the union because we are actually doing something 
about it, they see changes. (Union Representative 1, HaulageCo) 
Union representatives further highlighted the way in which the union used its workplace 
bargaining power to improve the working conditions at HaulageCo. They acknowledged the 
strategic position that the union occupied within the supply chain and the ripple effects that 
industrial action could have since ‘if industrial action would go forward it would halt the 
whole industry throughout Scotland.’ (Union Representative 2, HaulageCo). The same union 
representative further stated:  
The threat of industrial action is something we have used to our advantage to push 
[management] to sign a number of agreements (…) as soon as [spirit 
manufacturers] know we want industrial action they are right on at [HaulageCo's] 
Managing Director ‘get it sorted or you can give up’. (Union Representative 2, 
HaulageCo)  
Using its associational and structural power resources, the union articulated a broader view of 
the workplace that emphasised the commonalities across different firms and the need to 
mobilise coalitions and lobby for change at the sectoral level. Owing to the poor working 
conditions outlined above, union representatives often described the necessity to tackle this 
issue within and beyond HaulageCo’s organisational boundaries. According to one union 
representative, union action was particularly focused on intermediating with other actors in 
the SSI to improve health and safety conditions across distilleries and bottling sites, where 
drivers frequently suffered injuries due to inconsistent working practices or hazardous 
facilities. After proposing a motion to the Scottish Whisky Association (SWA) requiring 
logistic companies and spirit manufacturers to upgrade the system of loading and unloading 
spirit tankers, the SWA issued a non-compulsory directive asking companies to do so by 
2024. Agreements were signed by multiple actors at industry level with the aim of updating 
facilities across sites and eliminating unsafe work practices. One senior supply manager from 
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BottlingCo, confirming this intervention, elaborated on the role of the drivers’ trade union in 
the process of negotiating agreements across the supply chain:  
[HaulageCo] drivers have always been concerned with safety issues and they’ve 
put their case forward. So we were working with them [to introduce] the solera 
vat1 which is a different way of working and operating. They [drivers] have 
flagged that up and rightly so. So whenever we are building new equipment we 
don’t really want to wait for 2024 so we build it with this new system. (Senior 
Manager 4, BottlingCo) 
The consequence of the agreement was twofold. First, it contributed to better working 
conditions at industry level by creating binding regulations for the whole industry. Second, it 
bolstered the legitimacy of the trade union by cementing its role as a relevant actor within and 
beyond their organisational boundaries.  
 
5.  Discussion 
The aim of this article is to examine how pressures emanating from supply chains shape 
working conditions and industrial relations at workplace level. It contends that the current 
organisation of supply chains have several consequences for workers and organised labour. 
First, it shows that supply chain dynamics have a disciplining effect over labour, an effect that 
is driven by the enhanced capacity of management to secure workplace discipline and to 
shape working conditions. Therefore, the organisation of supply chains strengthens the 
management prerogative and diffuses the rationalisation agenda. This serves as a narrative to 
promote the harmonisation of employment and working practices in order to improve the 
flow of goods and services. A complex set of organisational changes, including the use of 
precarious work and the promotion of numerical and temporal flexibility is used to respond in 
a more cost-efficient and reliable manner to the demands of the markets.  
Second, our findings also suggest that the labour process was shaped by the risks associated 
with highly volatile markets that existed within the supply chain. Similar to Moore and 
Newsome’s (2018) study, this article shows that supply chain pressures intensified 
precariousness by forcing employers to externalise unproductive labour through early 
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termination of temporary contracts, unpredictable cuts of working time or unexpected 
changes in shifts and rostering. Therefore, as found in Moore and Newsome’s (2018) and 
Price’s (2016) studies, the evidence presented in this article shows that in the absence of 
powerful trade unions, efficiency and price rationales take precedence over concerns for 
workers’ welfare. In addition, rationalisation also drove employers to implement technology 
that was used to increase control and transparency within the labour process in an effort to 
reduce the indeterminacy of labour. Technology in this study was not used solely to further 
integrate inter-firm relations (Bonacich and Hamilton, 2011) but also as a means of 
monitoring the invisible spaces within the supply chain (Newsome, 2015). In turn, the 
increasing demand for greater oversight and regulation over all aspects of the labour process 
resulted in workers being increasingly monitored and their discretion and involvement in the 
labour process being further curtailed. These findings enrich Price’s (2016) and Wright and 
Lund’s (2003) evidence on the mechanisms that link supply chain pressures, cost competition 
and the intensification of the labour process. 
Third, the article discusses the broader implications of rationalisation for organised labour. It 
shows that trade unions can utilise their power resources to advance their interests (Gumbrell-
McCormick and Hyman, 2013). Yet, as the two case studies show, success is neither easy to 
achieve nor a certainty even in the context of a relatively well-organised trade union. The 
BottlingCo case study suggests that despite relatively high levels of associational power, 
unions can be co-opted into promoting and defending managerial policies which results in 
weakness and a loss of legitimacy. The low institutional support (Badigannavar and Kelly, 
2011; Heery, 2016) combined with slack local labour markets and a highly rationalised 
supply chain weakened the local trade union which ultimately internalised the managerial 
agenda.  
The expansion of precarious labour observed in BottlingCo collides directly with the 
precondition of power balance that Kelly (1998) identifies as a crucial factor for mobilisation. 
While making the articulation of a sense of injustice more difficult, the growing number of 
precarious workers also reveals the limits of local trade unions and the difficulties associated 
with a deep organising approach (Holgate et al., 2018). It is therefore no surprise that the 
union’s exclusive strategy (Doellgast et al., 2018) increasingly alienated both permanent and 
atypical workers.  
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This article also demonstrates that local partnerships acted as channels for rationalisation 
policies. In this sense, findings give weight to arguments that describe the partnership agenda 
as a symptom of trade union weakness (Kelly, 1996). Caught between competing goals, 
unions end up functioning rather as active advocates of management interests (Wilton, 2011). 
A related contribution is to stress that associational power is not solely a matter of union 
membership, density or legitimacy but it is also an outcome of the ways in which the unions’ 
and their representatives’ actions are shaped by the wider context in which they are 
embedded. The partnership agreement present in BottlingCo localised the potential conflict 
stemming from increasingly precarious contractual conditions and disabled union’s capacity 
to frame a more encompassing agenda around precarious issues. In HaulageCo, in an attempt 
to reduce the indeterminacy of labour, management implemented new technological control 
which not only augmented the surveillance over the labour process but also restrained the 
drivers’ input and agency over their own work (Thompson and Newsome, 2004). These 
findings demonstrate that control over the labour process is being shifted from the workplace 
to supply chain level (Thompson and Van den Broek, 2010), thus limiting the effectiveness of 
local union strategies.   
However, in supply chain configurations where trade union regulation is possible, the 
strategic position of the workplace may enable and enhance specific power resources. In 
HaulageCo the local union strategically used health and safety standards as a platform to 
empower the process of mobilisation, organisation and creation of opportunities for action 
which enhanced its legitimacy amongst workers (Kelly, 1998). Most importantly, the 
HaulageCo case study shows that trade unions can be successful in defending workers’ 
employment rights by exploiting the opportunities provided by the architecture of the supply 
chain. Even with weakened institutional support, the workplace strength combined with 
strong associational power provided the foundation for the local trade union to strategically 
take advantage of supply chain “choke points” (Bonacich and Wilson, 2008) and improve 
working conditions.   
Key to this outcome is the central role that trade unions have in asserting coalitions with other 
organisations with the aim to regulate working conditions in highly pressurised supply chains. 
In HaulageCo, the union’s successful attempt to reframe poor health and safety standards as 
an industry issue (rather than restricting it to their workplace) provided the opportunity for 
workers to enhance their bargaining power and to promote multi-sited governance 
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compromises. Therefore, the union compensated for the lack of institutional support with an 
inclusive strategy (Doellgast et al., 2018) that framed health and safety issues as a sectoral 
rather than workplace issue. In doing so, the union used its associational and structural power 
resources to make credible threats and promote the interests of its constituents. While this 
does not bode well for workers that do not occupy a strategic position within the supply 
chain, it serves to further highlight the need for broad multi-sited coalitions as well as 
innovative strategies to further workers’ capacity to defend their interests.  
This article identifies supply chain rationalisation as a form of control of the labour process 
and argues that it intersects with precarious forms of employment and the use of technology 
to give rise to indirect control strategies over worker agency. In doing so, this article 
contributes to current debates on union renewal by arguing that it is the detailed examination 
of the intersection between the supply chain dynamics (macro-level) and workplace outcomes 
(micro-level) that are crucial for understanding the factors that impact workers’ capacity to 
organise and mobilise.  
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Notes 
1. Solera Vat is a container, which can be used in the whisky industry in the process of 
ageing and blending spirits. 
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